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FEDERALISM AND LABOR RELATIONS.
IN THE UNITED STATES
Paul R. Hayst
INTRODUCTION
A federal constitution may carefully define the spheres in which
the Federal Government or the constituent states shall operate to the
exclusion of the other, or it may leave the allocation of functions to
future determination. In the United States the allocation of control
over labor relations under the constitutional power of Congress "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states" '
may be looked upon as a continuing process of adjustment of the Fed-
eral relation. The power to regulate may be left to the states, pro-
hibited to the states, taken over by the Federal Government or given or
returned to the states from time to time as occasion for change arises.
Until 1937 the Supreme Court assumed the power to allocate con-
trol of labor relations between states and Federal Government. By
means of a generally restrictive, though somewhat flexible, definition
of "commerce," the Court gave extensive powers to the states to the
exclusion of the Federal Government. However, influenced by the
trend toward national integration, particularly notable in the increase
in size of operating economic units which was greatly accelerated by
economic depression, and recognizing the inadequacy of judicial ma-
chinery and doctrinaire solutions for meeting the growing complexity
of economic problems, the Court, by broadening its definition of "com-
t Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This Article was
presented as a paper at the Second Bicentennial Conference at Columbia University
which was held January 11-14, 1954. It will appear in The Columbia University
Bicentennial Conference Series, Vol. II, FnEALisM, to be published by Doubleday &
Co. in December, 1954.
1. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
(959)
960 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
merce," finally relinquished to Congress the power to allocate control
over labor relations.
The Supreme Court's action was generally considered to be a part
of a growing tendency toward "centralization," and it is probable that
the Court looked upon its transfer of power to Congress as in fact a
recognition of the need for national rather than state regulation of
labor relations. There is, however, nothing in the American constitu-
tional system which designates the Court as the sole guardian of the
federal system. After all, the framers of the Constitution provided
that the legislature, not the Court, would reflect in its structure the
continuing existence of the states. There are many instances of con-
gressional action, such as those involving state regulation of intoxicat-
ing liquor,2 insurance ' and tidelands oil,4 which indicate that on oc-
casion Congress can be an even more zealous guardian of federalism
than the Court. The federalist idea is deeply rooted in the American
people. It is shared alike by presidents, judges, administrators and
members of Congress, and it is always a major factor in the actual
process of allocation of power, wherever the power to make that al-
location may lie. Moreover, the non-ideological pressures which fa-
vor "centralization" and "uniformity" are frequently balanced by other
pressures which favor state control and local variation. Study and ex-
perience have shown that the exercise of power by one government has
been ineffective or less effective than when exercised by the other.
These considerations lead in practice to the accommodation of the con-
stitutional system to new and changing needs with no major impair-
ment of basic aspects of its federal structure. The method of entrust-
ing to the Federal Government the function of continuous constitu-
tional revision, whether the power of allocation of control is in the
hands of the Court or of the legislature, does not by any means neces-
sarily lead to the concentration of power in that government to the
exclusion of the states.
There are, moreover, extremely important reasons for preferring
that Congress rather than the Court administer the federalist system in
a field as complex as labor relations. The allocation of power in such
a field must be worked out for each situation with careful considera-
tion of a large number of economic, sociological, political and adminis-
trative factors. The legislative method is better adapted to the require-
ments of this type of thoughtful planning than is the judicial method.
2. Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U.S.C. §122 (1946).
3. 59 STAT. 33, 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-5 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 448
(1947), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-3 (Supp. 1952).
4. Submerged Lands Act, 67 STAT. 29, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-3, 1311-5 (Supp.
1953).
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At the present moment there is a constitutional crisis in the field
of labor relations. In exercising its new function Congress has made
what has proved in experience to be an unsatisfactory allocation of
power as between state and Federal Government. The problem of re-
allocation is now before it as possibly the most important problem in
labor relations facing the country today. It is equally important as a
problem in federalism since it involves the question of whether a flexible
federalist system can be successfully administered by the national legis-
lature in a field of intricate complexity.
I
THE COURT TRANSFERS POWER TO CONGRESS
In 1937, the Supreme Court relinquished its control over the ad-
ministration of the federal system in the field of labor relations.5 The
Court, in ceding to Congress practically unlimited power to control
all aspects of the production and distribution of goods, left no signifi-
cant elements of regulation in this field to the exclusive power of the
states. Not only may Congress regulate labor relations in interstate
commerce but it may regulate those relations which "affect" interstate
commerce." Its power, moreover, does not depend on "any particular
volume of commerce affected more than that to which the courts would
apply the maxim de minimis." 7
"Congress' power to keep the interstate market free of goods
produced under conditions inimical to the general welfare . . .
may be exercised in individual cases without showing any specific
effect upon interstate commerce . . . ; it is enough that the in-
dividual activity when multiplied into a general practice is subject
to federal control . . . or that it contains a threat to the in-
terstate economy that requires preventive regulation." 8
Almost simultaneously with the Court's relinquishment to Con-
gress of the function of allocating power over labor relations under the
Commerce Clause, the long history of the Court's regulation of this
field under the "economic" interpretation of the Due Process Clauses
also came to an end. Beginning in 1940, however, the Court, now bas-
ing its action on the constitutional protection of personal freedoms, re-
sumed its power to regulate an important segment of labor relations.
In a series of cases involving picketing the Court undertook to formu-
5. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
6. Ibid.
7. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
8. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
236 (1948).
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late a new system of limitations on legislative controls.' The alloca-
tion of this power to the Court promptly proved to be unworkable and
unrealistic and it was generally disregarded by the states, which con-
tinued to regulate picketing with little change from former practice.
After a few years the Court in effect abandoned its "picketing doctrine"
and returned the regulation of picketing substantially to the status in
which it stood prior to 1940.1"
Other efforts to induce the Court to return "to the due process
philosophy that has been deliberately discarded" have been largely
unsuccessful." The power of the Court over regulation of the right to
organize and the right to strike have been confined to very narrow
limits. 2  The Court, however, has decided certain cases involving racial
discrimination in such a way as to suggest the possibility of its playing
a role of great importance in the regulation of the whole field of col-
lective bargaining. 3 Faced with this possibility in a recent case which
did not present the element of racial discrimination, the Court, while
denying recovery and somewhat limiting the implications of its prior
decisions, did not indicate clearly a disposition to forego regulation of
collective bargaining.14 But some of the lower federal courts have
shown decided reluctance to accept further regulatory power.' 5
Whatever may develop to be the Court's future course in accepting
or rejecting the temptations afforded by the Due Process Clauses, there
can be no doubt that the general field of regulation of labor relations
is now within the power of Congress.
II
CONGRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The advantages of a flexible federalism which permits the alloca-
tion and reallocation by varying methods and in varying degrees of
9. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) ; AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) ;
Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Carpenters and Joiners
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) ; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos,
320 U.S. 293 (1943).
10. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
See also Gibonej v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ; Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Building Service Employees International
Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
11. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 537 (1949).
12. See Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., Mpra
note 11; International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
245 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
13. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).
14. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
15. E.g., Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952); Courant v.
International Photographers, 176 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1949).
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the power to regulate labor relations have not in practice been fully
realized. Congress has not yet understood fully the implications of
the Court's transfer to it of the duty of allocating power. It has been
slow to grasp the fact that the long history of the guardianship of
federalism in this area by the Court has ended. In adopting the Labor-
Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),:' Congress
failed to give necessary consideration to the problem of allocation of
power in the federal system. Confusion has resulted in the absence of
clear allocation in the statute itself, and practical difficulties have arisen
where allocations have proved to be unworkable. The Court, in its
effort to complete the task of allocation which Congress left half-done,
has added to the number of practical difficulties. Congress now has be-
fore it the problems raised by its original failure to give sufficient at-
tention to the federalist impact of its action.
The picture thus presented does not reveal any weakness in the
federal structure itself or, indeed, provide any basis for doubt as to
the advantages of the flexibility in that structure which is applicable to
the regulation of labor relations. If all decisions as to allocation of
power were invariably made with the most carefully reasoned consid-
eration for the best possible operation of the federal system, there would
still arise situations in which the careful calculations proved to be
wrong, as well as situations in which changes in the facts on which
calculations were based demanded revision of the scheme of allocation.
Moreover, the method of leaving to the courts or to administrative
tribunals the working out of some of the details of distribution of power
may provide in many instances an opportunity to complete the alloca-
tion of power in accordance with demonstrated needs in particular sit-
uations. But, although flexibility provides the possibility of keeping a
federal constitutional system workable in its application to the complex
and changing demands of the regulation of labor relations, the implica-
tions of this federalism must be understood and carefully considered by
Congress if unnecessary confusion and difficulty are to be avoided.
As practical problems have multiplied the need for careful consid-
eration of the many interrelated factors which must enter into a decision
concerning the manner in which power should be allocated, the proc-
esses of case-by-case decision have come to be less and less adequate to
the demands of the situation. The Court has done well to leave larger
and larger areas to Congress and, by the enormous enlargement of the
concept of interstate commerce and, to some extent, the withdrawal
from the field of "economic due process," to turn over to Congress a
large part of its duties as keeper of the federal system.
16. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1948).
19541
964 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
The failure of Congress fully to assume its new obligations and
the inadequacy for practical purposes of the methods available to the
Court for supplementing the action of Congress are illustrated in ten
cases arising out of the National Labor Relations Act.17  The Court
has twice taken occasion to remark on the failure of Congress to indi-
cate clearly in the NLRA the boundaries of state and federal power.
"Congress has not seen fit," said Mr. Justice Jackson, "to lay down
even the most general of guides to construction of the Act, as it some-
times does, by saying that its regulation either shall or shall not exclude
state action." '1
The legislative history of the Wagner Act shows that little atten-
tion was paid to the federalist aspects of the statute. And, though the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, because of its greater reach,
added enormously to the problems of federalism, it contributed no more
to the solution of these problems than had legislation of the earlier
period. The legislative history of the 1947 act contains a few quotable
generalizations about federal preemption and makes some references to
state action, but the opinion 9 which most confidently relied on this
language almost certainly misinterpreted the congressional intent.
The difficulties arising from lack of a clear allocation of power by
Congress and from unworkable allocations made by the Court in some
cases, have alerted Congress and interested parties to the problem and,
in the 1953 hearings"0 before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare on proposed revision of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act, much consideration was given to it. The record of these
hearings, however, indicates that there still is little comprehension on
the part of either senators or others of the complexities inherent in the
application of a flexible federalism to the field of labor relations.
Once the Court had surrendered to Congress the duty of allocating
between state and Federal Government the power of regulation in this
17. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315
U.S. 740 (1942); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); La Crosse Telephone Corp. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 18 (1949); Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) ; Inter-
national Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949);
Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 338 U.S. 953
(1950); International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Amalgamated Ass'n
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951) ; Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
18. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767, 771 (1947); International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 245, 252 (1949).
19. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S.
383 (1951).
20. Hearings before Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on- Proposed Revi-
sions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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field, theoretically the only duty of the Court was to determine what
allocation Congress had decided to make. The Court had already
developed certain guides supposedly applicable to this situation: Had
Congress "laid hold" of the very matter which the state sought to
regulate? Did the attempted state regulation "conflict with" the fed-
eral regulation which Congress had adopted? But the concept of
identity of subject matter is itself an abstraction since in the cases
which came before the Court, the state was not seeking to regulate sit-
uations in which the Federal Government had already acted, but rather
situations in which state regulation seemed desirable because the Fed-
eral Government had not acted. The Court has had to decide whether
Congress intended "to preempt the whole field" or whether congres-
sional silence with respect to particular situations meant that those
situations were appropriate subjects for state regulation or were to be
left "unregulated."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, particularly in dissent, has argued that
the Court should accord a presumption of validity to regulation by the
state in these matters.21 Whatever virtue this position may have when
supported by argument based upon implications from the federal system
itself, it seems to be a sound reflection of congressional intent. The
legislative history and the structure of the two acts lead to the conclu-
sion that Congress discharged its new function as guardian of fed-
eralism in this field largely by taking for granted a complete system of
state regulation and seeking to superimpose on the state regulation
federal regulation of some aspects of the field. Although, as has been
said, there is little discussion of the problems of federalism, what little
exists is almost invariably in defense of particular provisions of the
Taft-Hartley Act as not depriving the states of power to regulate.
It congressional "intent" concerning state regulation of labor re-
lations may be derived not only from express comments on particular
aspects of the problem but also from the attitude of congressmen in
general, then the legislative history of the two acts taken as a whole
and the comments of the senators at the 1953 hearing on proposed
amendments support the contention that Congress intended to supple-
ment state regulation rather than to displace it. For example, Mr.
Hartley said, in answer to a question about the effect of the federal act
on Wisconsin Law: ". . . this will not interfere with the State of
Wisconsin in the administration of its own laws." 22 Senator Taft
said: "I may say that we never intended any preemption of the field.
21. See especially Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547 (1944) (dissenting opinion) ;
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 777
(1946) (concurring opinion).
22. 93 CONG. REc. 6383 (1947).
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The Supreme Court has gone beyond what we intend." ' "In general,
I am quite willing to leave it to the states, the control of anything that
we can do." 24 "Of course, I do not offhand see why the states cannot
handle a local public utilities strike, a street car strike, or anything else,
as well, as the Federal Government. . . . Do you think there should
be some legislation at least to stop this preemption doctrine"? 25 Sen-
ator Smith (N. J.) said: "Of course, if you say to any section of this
country, not necessarily to the South, but also to some of the Western
States, 'we arc going to tell you what kind of law you are going to have
for the relationship between management and labor in your state,' you
are not going to create a healthy atmosphere by such legislation being
forced down their throats. . . . Let me remind you that, as we all
know, we had a problem in the South that led to our Civil War, and
we are still trying to heal the wounds of that conflict. We have here
in our Congress, in our own Senate, representatives of the Southern
States. We are trying to heal those differences and bring about mutual
understanding. But the mere passage of legislation, to be superimposed
on any one area of the country is not going to solve the problem." 2'
Senator Goldwater demanded to know the basis for a witness' state-
ment that "the laws of the United States shall be supreme law of the
land." When told that the statement was based on the Constitution,
Senator Goldwater asked, "The Congress has to be given that right
by the States by agreement; is that right?" 27 The Senator was so
deeply shocked by the statement that he later repeated it to another
witness and asked, "Do you feel, as attorney general of Nebraska, that
that is a true statement, that in this particular field the federal law is
the supreme law of the land ?" 28 -The hearings before the House '.
Judic'iary Committee on the recent New Jersey-New York Wateifront
Commission Compact 29 contain repeated indications of impatience with
any questioning concerning the provisions of the Compact, on .fhe
ground that what the states want to do is no concern of Congress,'
although the Compact regulates labor relations in an industry of vital
importance to interstate and foreign commerce.
Yet a majority of the Court, in passing on state legislation which
was claimed to be beyond state power under the Labor-Management
23. Hearings, supra note 20, at 284.
24. Id. at 286.
25. Id. at 721.
26. Id. at 1538.
27. Id. at 606.
28. Id. at 879.
29. Hearings before Sub-Committee No. 3 of the House Committee on Judiciary
on HR. 6286, H.R. 6321, H.R. 6343, and Sen. 2383, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
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Relations Act, has tended consistently to find that Congress intended
to allocate power to the Federal Government to the exclusion of the
states.
Although the National Labor Relations Act declares in the most
general terms the rights of "employees" to engage in collective bargain-
ing and other types of "concerted activities," the system of regulation
set up by the Act protects them in the exercise of these rights only
from interference by employers. It seems possible that Congress "in-
tended" to regulate rights between employers and employees which
were not the subject of affirmative regulation by the states at the time
of the adoption of the Act. That it "intended" to deny to a state the
power to regulate, for example, by requiring a majority vote of em-
ployees before strike action can be taken, is highly doubtful. Yet it is
the Court's view that Congress has excluded the states from the regu-
lation of all those activities which the Act declares to be the rights of
employees.
Congress has created an administrative tribunal, the National
Labor Relations Board, to determine in situations involving alleged in-
terference by employers whether the activities interfered with are within
the protection of the NLRA, and, in situations where the employer
claims that he interfered with employees because they engaged in activi-
ties which are not so protected, to determine whether the employees did
in fact engage in such activities. But where it is the state, rather than
the employer, which attempts to regulate, the National Labor Relations
Board will frequently have no power to act at all because no employer
interference is alleged. Under the Court's interpretation of the Act, a
question arises as to who is to decide in such a case whether the activi-
ties are of the type protected by the Act and whether the employees en-
gaged in such activities."'
The National Labor Relations Act gives employees the right "to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing" 32
and provides a procedure for protecting them in such choice from inter-
ference by their employer. Did Congress "intend" to exclude a state
from regulating such choice by, for example, providing that an ex-
convict could not serve as a representative? It seems unlikely; yet the
Court appears to believe that the Act is so to be interpreted3
30. See especially Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
340 U.S. 383 (1951).
31. See International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
245 (1949).
32. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §157 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.SC. § 157 (Supp. 1952).
33. See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1944).
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A holding of the Court that Wisconsin could regulate mass picket-
ing and violence was based largely on the view that the National Labor
Relations Act did not purport to regulate these activities. 34 This is
only partly true since in deciding a question of employer interference
the National Board must frequently determine whether employees en-
gaged in such activities. But more important, the amended Act, which
added certain direct prohibitions on the activities of labor organiza-
tions,"3 does regulate mass picketing and violence. Does this mean,
by the Court's criterion, that Congress intended to withdraw from the
states the power to controlviolence on a picket line,-that, for example,
the state's police could not keep pickets from destroying the plant?
Obviously Congress had no such intention.
The Court has held that, where the Congress chose to regulate
strikes which create a national emergency, its rejection of proposed
legislation which would have regulated local emergencies as well indi-
cates an intention that local emergencies should be "unregulated." 31
It seems much more likely that Congress "intended" to leave such
regulation to the states.
The Court, like Congress, has not fully realized the implications
of its surrender of power over the administration of federalism in the
field of regulation of labor relations. It has failed to recognize that
Congress, too, can be a keeper of federalism. The Court appears to
have assumed that, once Congress was given the duty of allocation
of power between state and nation, it would promptly allocate power
to the Federal Government. By tending to construe the intent of Con-
gress in the direction of taking power rather than of leaving it to the
states, the Court underestimates the power of federalism as an affirma-
tive concept of government and as a basic element in American politi-
cal thought.
III
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM BY CONGRESS
The very complexities which have made it impossible for the Court
to administer the federalist system on a case-by-case basis in this field
have also made impossible the simple solution which Congress appar-
ently intended for the federalist aspects of the problem it faced. The
elements of federal regulation can be carefully fitted into a system of
state regulation. They cannot be superimposed on it.
34. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S.
740 (1942).
35. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (Supp. 1948).
36. Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S.
383 (1951).
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The difficulties which the Labor-Management Relations Act poses
for the federal system are not to be solved, then, by the Court's seeking
to ascertain the intent of Congress, but only by Congress itself. Con-
gress now has the duty of "accommodating" federal and state power in
this field and, as the long history of federalism indicates, it is not a
duty which can properly be discharged in any off-hand way.
General formulas will not suffice. In the course of the 1953 hear-
ings on proposed amendments to the Labor-Management Relations
Act,8 7 representatives of management advocated again and again "a
stronger federal law" and at the same time one which would leave
"more room for the states to act." The Senators, like Taft, who were
beginning to realize the complexities of federalism, tried without suc-
cess to induce these witnesses to suggest specific applications of their
general formulas. Frequently the non-lawyers seemed to be parroting
the opinions of their counsel. The lawyers were little more helpful.
Their formulas were derived from the decisions which the Court had
been forced to abandon as inadequate when it relinquished to Congress
the administration of federalism in this field.
The fact is that, as the Court recognized, the old distinctions such
as "local and national" are no longer sufficient and Congress cannot
allocate power on the basis of such distinctions any more successfully
than could the Court. Certain aspects of activities which under the old
formulas are "national" in character should be subject to state control;
some "local" activities must be controlled by the Federal Government.
After all, the formula. "local or national," was invented, and was use-
ful, only in determination of the now-settled issue of limitation on
congressional power. The present issue is an entirely different one-
the issue of where power can most desirably be allocated in a federal
system such as ours.
The National Labor Relations Board has formulated certain rules
of thumb based on size to govern its determinations of when it will and
when it will not take jurisdiction. But distinctions of mere size of op-
eration have already been found insufficient. Not.only did the Board,
even in its original formulation, treat some categories, such as war
industries, on bases other than mere size, but also from time to time
it has been forced to depart from the rules as originally formulated.
In order to be successful in its administration of federalism in the
field of labor relations, Congress will have to give up reliance on pre-
existing formulas and on simple solutions and turn to such basic consid-
erations as the effect of specific allocations of power on the national
economy. The simple solution, for example, of the problem of
37. Hearings, supra note 20.
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economic competition among the states is uniform federal regulation.
Forty years ago manufacturers operating in Massachusetts felt that
they could not compete with those operating in North Carolina if they
were not as free as those in North Carolina to employ young children
at low wages. Today the same problem of competition is raised with
relation to state limitations on the closed shop. In fact, every difference
in wages, hours and working conditions is to some extent relevant to
competitive status. Since the simple solution of total federal regulation
is not acceptable and since the federal system is going to be preserved
in the field of labor relations, Congress has the problem of determining
which aspects require national regulation in order to eliminate or re-
duce competition and which may be allocated to state regulation, either
because the preservation of federalism is more important than the elim-
ination of competition or because their effect on competitive status is
so slight as not to justify national regulation.
There are also basic problems which may be called sociological.
However narrowly the policy of the NLRA is defined in terms of pre-
venting interruptions to the free flow of commerce, actually it must be
looked upon in a much larger way as free enterprise's answer to social-
ism. It assures the freedom of the worker to organize, to increase
his bargaining power and to participate in the determination of his
own economic destiny. And by giving him this status it gives him the
opportunity to better his economic condition instead of granting him
benefits directly through the machinery of government. But control
and regulation of this power are as necessary with respect to the or-
ganizations of labor as they are with respect to the organizations of
capital. The problem of federalism is, then, what part the federal
government and what part the states should play in protecting and in
limiting these rights.
In the decision of these basic questions there is the need to con-
sider the problem of effective administration of standards. Which gov-
ernment is better able to achieve results which both are seeking? In
some particulars the answer is obvious. For example, effective con-
trol of violence in connection with labor disputes is going to continue
to be the duty of the state merely because Congress is not going to
create a national police force for this purpose. Such a conclusion can
bethought of as arising from basic assumptions of the federalist system
itself. But there are other problems to be solved in empirical terms.
State labor relations boards where they exist have, in general, acted
more promptly and, therefore, more effectively, than has the National
Board. Are there not some aspects of the labor relations picture where
prompt and effective action is more important than that the action
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should be exactly the same action which the National Board would
have taken in the same circumstances? There is an obvious need for
more careful supervision of the large and ever-increasing union "wel-
fare" funds. Has state supervision of insurance in general, which
Congress has in a sense endorsed,38 proved sufficiently effective so that
power over these funds should be allocated to the states? Is there in
fact such a need for uniformity in the administration of collective agree-
ments that the federal courts must be given a mandate to develop a
body of law applicable to this matter? What role can state mediation
and conciliation agencies play in the peaceful settlement of disputes?
This is not the place to suggest solutions for these problems. The
important point is that there is no single simple solution. Labor rela-
tions is a field of enormous, varied complexities. The Court, as it be-
gan to realize the complex nature of the problem of allocation of power,
also realized that the facilities available to it in the judicial process of
case-by-case decision were inadequate to provide solution. Congress
has the facilities and is now called upon to use them thoughtfully and
wisely in the discharge of its duty to administer the federal system.
IV
METHODS OF ALLOCATION OF POWER
Congress has available to it and has used a number of different
methods of allocating the power to control labor relations between the
state and the Federal Government. It has sometimes given that power
to the Federal Government and expressly excluded the states as in Sec-
tion 14 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides that
"no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals
defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law,
either national or local relating to collective bargaining." It has some-
times expressly allocated power to the states as in Section 14 (b) of
the National Labor Relations Act, which provides that "nothing in this
Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi-
tion of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution
or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." Congress
has sometimes itself established certain minimum standards, leaving to
the states regulation in the area above these minima, as in the Fair
Labor Standards Act, Section 18 of which provides that:
"No provision of this Act or of any order thereunder shall excuse
noncompliance with any . . . State law . . establishing a
38. 59 STAT. 33, 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§1011-5 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT.
448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012-3 (Supp. 1952).
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minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under
this Act or a maximum workweek lower than the maximum work-
week established under this Act, and no provision of this Act re-
lating to the employment of child labor shall justify noncompliance
with any . . . State law . . . establishing a higher standard
than the standard established under this Act.. , ."9
Congress has also used the nethod, as in the case of unemployment
compensation, of allocating control to the states while at the same time
securing, through the "spending" power, the adoption by the states of
certain minimum standards.
- There are cases in which Congress may properly employ the
method of leaving some details of power allocation to be completed
by the Court. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act regulates
wages and hours only in the case of employees who are "engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 4o The Court
must complete the allocation of power by determining on a case-by-case
basis to which employees the statute applies and which employees are
left subject to regulation by the states.41 Whether or not this is the
best method of allocation, it is one in which the Court should have
special skill after its many. years of defining commerce for purposes of
power allocation. The Court als6 properly participates in the alloca-
tion of power in cases in which, for example, it interprets the express
exemptions of congressional legislation, such as the exemption of agri-
cultural labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act 41 or of independent
contractors under the Labor-Management Relations Act.' This type
of determination is, of course, thought of as "statutory interpretation,"
and in fact it shades off at one end of the scale into a mechanical appli-
cation of a determination actually made by Congress. But frequently
it is much more, and the Court, applying the same types of criteria 'as
Congress itself applies to the problem, is actually partcipating jointly
with Congress in the distribution of power. The real difference be-
tween the Court's function when it is determining allocation on the
fundamental bases of constitutional power, e. g., deciding that the states
shall have the power of regulation to the exclusion of the national gov-
ernment, and when it is determining allocation on some other basis, is,
of course, that its determination is conclusive in the former instance,
whereas in the latter instance Congress may decide upon a different
39. 52 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §218 (1946).
40. 52 STAT. 1062 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §206 (Supp. 1952).
41. See, e.g., Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) ; Borden v. Borella,
325 U.S. 679 (1945) ; 10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
42. 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §207(e) (Supp. 1952).
43. 61 STAT. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (Supp. 1948).
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distribution.44 It is interesting to note in this connection that while the
Court clearly has the final word on the allocation of power exclusively
to the states, Congress appears to have the final word in the converse
situation. If, for example, a state should by statute require that every
theater have an orchestra of live musicians, theoretically the Court
could determine that the state had the power so to regulate with respect
to small local theaters, but that such a regulation of large theaters or
chain theaters was an unwarranted burden on commerce.45 The deter-
mination of the Court, giving to the state the power over local theaters,
to -the extent that this determination was based on constitutional power
to regulate, would be final. But Congress. could reject that part of the
determination which excluded the state from regulating the larger
theaters and reallocate that power to the state.46
There is no fundamental objection to Congress' using the tech-
nique of delegating to the Court the duty of completing an incomplete
allocation of power. It is in fact frequently a useful technique, since
it can provide a certain flexibility for the treatment of special situations.
The difficulty arises when Congress fails to provide proper guidance
to the Court for making such determinations. The National Labor
Relations Act, for example, regulates certain aspects of labor relations
but does not clearly provide whether the power is given to the states
to regulate other related aspects. It regulates some matters in certain
ways and does not make it clear whether the states are to have power
to regulate those same matters in other ways. It gives employees the
right to choose bargaining representatives but does not indicate what
power the states may have to limit the choice by, for example, forbid-
ding convicted criminals from acting as such representatives. It gives
power to a national agency, the National Labor Relations Board, to
determine the employees' choice of representatives when application is
44. E.g., Congress--dissatisfied with the allocation of power made by the Court
in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)-provided for a different
distribution by an amendment to Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
See H.R. REI,. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947) (Report of House Committee
on Education and Labor on the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947). (In de-
ciding on the content of classifications of employees who are included in the Act or
exempted from its provisions, the Court does not necessarily determine the question ot
whether Congress "intended" that employees not covered by the Act should be subject
to state regulation or should be "unregulated." But cf. Utah Valley Hospital v.
Industrial Comm'n, 199 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952) (non-profit hospitals which are
exempted from the Act are subject to state jurisdiction).)
45. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), where the Court
so held with respect to a state law limiting the length of trains, one of many such
laws passed by legislatures under the guise of safety legislation, but actually largely
at the instance of the railroad unions whose purpose was to make more work for their
members.
46. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
47. See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
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made to that Board for such a determination, though there is no require-
merit whatever that any such application be made and no prohibition
on the functioning of a bargaining representative in the absence of such
a determination. Since the Act is silent on the subject, the question
arises whether a labor organization which wishes to function as a bar-
gaining representative and which may do so without any recourse to
the Board, can properly apply to a state agency for a determination of
the question of whether it is the choice of the employees.4" The Act
provides (Section 7) that "employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or for other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all such activities." Other sections of the Act
set up an elaborate system to protect employees from interference by
employers and labor organizations in the exercise of these rights. Ex-
cept in the one instance of Section 14, already referred to, nothing is
said about state power to regulate these same rights. May a state for-
bid certain types of concerted activities such as recurrent work stop-
pages?" May a state require a majority vote before employees can
strike " or by substitution of compulsory arbitration forbid strikes in
essential industries?1 The Act empowers the National Labor Rela-
tions Board to determine whether there has been violence in connection
with a strike and in certain cases to prohibit such violence. Are the
state police and the state courts, therefore, deprived of the power to
deal with violent conduct where it is a part of a labor dispute?2
Congress left the Supreme Court to complete these imperfect allo-
cations of power, and in the cases cited in the foregoing footnotes the
Court undertook this function. In these instances the result of the
joint work of Congress and the Court has proved to be unsatisfactory
and unworkable. The states have, in the main, disregarded the allo-
cation and, in the absence of a more practical definition of their powers,
continued to regulate most matters in accordance with former prac-
48. See La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 18 (1949).
49. See International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S.
245 (1949).
50. See International Union v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
51. See Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S.
383 (1951).
52. See Matter of Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 165 (1952). In this case the Massa-
chusetts courts prohibited a strike on the ground that it was (1) In violation of a
contract and (2) accompanied by violence. The Board subsequently held the con-
trary as to both counts. In effect the Board holding was that the Massachusetts courts
had prohibited the exercise of a right guaranteed by federal law.
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tice.r  The problem of reallocation has become, and is recognized to
be, one of the major problems of revision of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Congress has also allocated to the Federal Government a large
segment of the regulation of labor relations by Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, which gives the federal courts jurisdiction
in cases involving breach of collective agreements. Although the full
implications of this section are not yet clear, it appears that the effect
of the statute is to create a new uniform federal common law applicable
to all collective agreements and to displace existing state regulation
of this subject.54 It seems probable that, although the state courts will
have the power to continue to pass upon such cases, they will be re-
quired to apply the new federal law.
The allocation of power to the Federal Government through the
method of giving jurisdiction to the federal courts, without at the same
time providing by statute for the substantive rights to be enforced in
those courts, is novel. There is considerable doubt that Congress
actually intended to give the federal courts exclusive power to provide
substantive regulation for this important area of the field of labor rela-
tions, since the principal evil which the Congress sought to correct was
the impossibility of suing incorporated unions as legal entities under
the procedure of some states. 5  It may be that Congress intended to
employ a different method of distributing power between state and
Federal Government by merely making the federal courts available for
the enforcement of state substantive regulation. However, not only
are there serious analytical objections to this view, since it is hard for
53. Montgomery Bldg. & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter, 256 Ala. 678,
57 So.2d 112, appeal dismissed on ground that cert. improzidently granted, 344 U.S.
178 (1952); Kincaid Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn, 362 Mo. 375, 241 S.W.2d 886
(1951) ; Erinn Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 234 N.C. 321, 67 S.E.2d 372 (1951) ;
Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 369 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1952) ; Williams
v. Cedartown Textiles, Inc., 208 Ga. 659, 68 S.E.2d 705 (1952); Lion Oil Co. v.
March, 220 Ark. 678, 249 S.W.2d 569 (1952); Sommer v. Metal Trades Council,
40 Cal.2d 392, 254 P.2d 559 (1953); Russell v. International Union, 258 Ala. 615,
64 So.2d 384 (1953) ; Kinard Construction Co. v. Building Trades Council, 258 Ala.
500, 64 So.2d 400 (1953) ; Goodwins Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697
(1951) ; State v. Dobson, 195 Ore. 533, 245 P.2d 903 (1952). But cf. Norris Grain
Co. v. Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W.2d 94 (1950) ; Fairibault Daily News v. Inter-
national Typographical Union, 236 Minn. 303, 53 N.W.2d 36 (1952); State v. Mont-
gomery Ward, 233 P.2d 685 (Utah), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951); Ryan v.
Simons, 302 N.Y. 742, 98 N.E.2d 707, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 897 (1951) ; Costaro v.
Simons, 302 N.Y. 318, 98 N.E.2d 454 (1951); McNish v. American Brass Co., 139
Conn. 44, 89 A.2d 566 (1952).
54. See Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1950) ; Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950) ;
International Union v. Dahlem Construction Co., 193 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951); Fay
v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; Hamilton Foundry
& Machine Co. v. International Molders & Foundry Workers, 193 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1951).
55. See SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947) (Report of Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on the proposed Federal Labor Relations
Act of 1947).
19541
976 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
lawyers to believe in the existence of substantive regulations for which
there is no method of enforcement, but also there is some doubt as to
whether, under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, Congress has
the power to provide that questions arising under the common law of
a state become questions arising under the laws of the United States
by merely giving jurisdiction over such questions to the federal courts.
Another method of allocation of control over labor relations which
Congress has used is that of delegating to an administrative tribunal
discretion to determine within a limited area which powers should be
exercised by the Federal Government and which by the states. Before
the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act, though no express statutory basis
for the practice existed, the National Labor Relations Board by agree-
ment with state boards, and particularly with the New York State
Labor Relations Board, shared with these boards a number of fairly
important aspects of the regulatory power. Section 10(a) of the
Taft-Hartley Act provides that:
"the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any
State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any
cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, com-
munications and transportation except where predominantly local
in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes
affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Terri-
torial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such
agency is inconsistent with the Corresponding provision of this
Act or has received a construction inconsistent therewith."
In the Board's view none of the state statutes is consistent with
the national act. The agreements which existed prior to the inclusion
of this provision in the Act have, therefore, been abrogated and no
cession has been made.
The Board, which has had at all times since its inception more
cases than it could handle effectively and expeditiously, has adopted
the practice of declining to accept jurisdiction in instances where, in
the Board's view, the effect of the activities involved is primarily local
rather than national. This practice apparently has the approval of the
courts. The Supreme Court has said of it, "Even when the effect of
activities on interstate commerce is sufficient to enable the Board to
take jurisdiction of a complaint, the Board sometimes properly declines
to do so, stating that the policies of the Act would not be effectuated
by its assertion of jurisdiction in that case." 57 Since the Board does
56. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
U.S. 767, 783-97 (1947).
57. NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951). See also Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert.
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not "cede" jurisdiction to any state agency in these cases and since
presumably a state agency cannot act in the absence of such cession-
if it could (so runs the argument) there would be no need to provide
expressly for cession-these cases are left to a limbo of non-regulation
by either power, although there is clearly no policy justifying this re-
sult; actually, the only reason they are not handled by the Board is
that the Board is too busy to handle them. In order to illustrate the
defective operation of this allocation of power, we may assume that on
a small local building project there is activity which amounts to a sec-
ondary boycott of the type which is prohibited by Section 8(b) (4) of
the National Labor Relations Act. The Board declines jurisdiction,
not on the ground that the activity does not affect commerce but on
the ground that the project is essentially local in character. The state
cannot act because Congress has allocated the power to the Federal Gov-
ernment. Therefore, an activity which both the nation and the state
have made unlawful is permitted to continue because the details of the
allocation of power have not been adequately worked out in the joint
action of Congress and the Board. Naturally the states have rejected
this result and have continued to act in the absence of effective federal
regulation.5 8
Delegation to the Board of power to allocate to state agencies
certain aspects of labor relations is a highly useful device in the ad-
ministration of a flexible system of federalism in this field. Unfor-
tunately Congress failed to make wise use of it in the Taft-Hartley Act.
There are now before Congress several bills which would give the
Board this power. These bills, however, fail to take full advantage of
the opportunity to develop a plan for division of power based upon
thoughtful study of relevant political, economic and social factors.
They reflect rather the simplistic interstate-intrastate analysis which
the Supreme Court discarded as inadequate. To the extent, however,
that the bills suggest a division based on considerations of administra-
tive convenience, and therefore permit reinstitution of the former
"agreement" system, they would free the Board from the restrictions
imposed by the Act in its present form.
A novel method of allocation of the power to regulate labor rela-
tions is the recent New Jersey-New York Waterfront Commission
Compact. In this instance Congress gave its consent to a statute en-
acted by the legislatures of the two states which regulates certain im-
denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). In Joliet Contractors' Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833
(7th Cir. 1952), the court held that the Board had abused its discretion in refusing to
exercise its jurisdiction in a case involving certain building operations which the
Board had found to be "essentially local in character."
58."See cases cited note 53 supra.
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portant aspects of labor relations in one industry. Although, contrary
to testimony presented at the hearing before the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 9 the provisions of the Compact conflict with provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act in a number of important
particulars, the Compact is presumably a law of the United States
within the meaning of Article VI of the Constitution.
Congress, then, has available to it a number of techniques for
solution of its federalist problems, including establishment of minimum
standards, encouragement of state legislation and delegation of discre-
tionary powers of allocation in limited fields to courts and administra-
tive tribunals. Doubtless others can be devised. It may be that a pro-
cedure resembling Madison's rejected notion of a veto on state legisla-
tion would permit a large measure of state regulation and at the same
time protect against extreme action by individual states.
V
FLEXIBLE FEDERALISM AND MULTIPLE SOLUTIONS
Congress also has facilities for breaking this problem down into
many parts and treating them separately and differently where the reali-
ties of the situation require separate and different treatment. The
variety of problems is endless and each type may require a different
federalist solution. Congress has given to the Federal Government
control over the basic right to organize and to bargain collectively.
What limitations should states be permitted to impose on the activities
incident to those rights? The states have been given power with re-
spect to compulsory union membership. Are there other powers which
the states can best handle, such as the power to regulate strikes, picket-
ing and secondary boycotts? How should power be divided with re-
spect to the proper subjects of collective bargaining? What of the
myriad problems which arise in connection with intra-union affairs,
the right to membership, the right against discrimination, the right to
have a voice in the union government? What of welfare funds and the
check-off and bribery of union officials? What of inter-union relations
and rivalries, such as jurisdictional strikes? Each of these problems is
in fact a host of problems and it may be desirable to treat each sepa-
rately and differently in respect to distribution of power.
It may develop that different types of industries require different
treatment. The problem of compulsory union membership on the rail-
roads is governed by federal law. In respect to other industries Con-
gress has allocated power over this matter to the states. Congress has
59. Hearings, supra note 29.
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chosen to regulate strikes in certain types of industries which create
a "national emergency." Would it be well to leave to the states the
control of strikes in these same industries which create a "local emer-
gency" ?
The changes which develop with the passage of time may indicate
that particular distributions of power should be revised from time to
time. During war, for example, it may be thought necessary to allo-
cate the Federal Government certain powers which during peace are
given to the state, as when the orders of the National War Labor Board
superseded the Wisconsin law on compulsory unionism, while the state
law automatically regained validity with the conclusion of hostilities.6"
This flexible federalism also allows for trial and error. The allo-
cation by the Court of power to the Federal Government through "in-
terpretation" of the Labor-Management Relations Act has proved un-
workable in several respects. Congress is now called upon to reallo-
cate these powers to the states. There is no reason why this should not
be a continuous process as particular allocations are shown to be de-
sirable or undesirable in the way in which they actually work out.
60. See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
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